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Abstract:
The purpose of this paper is to compare the role of “bad” governance and
price distortions on economic growth. We therefore present a general equi-
librium growth model where some producers …nance a rent-seeking system
by setting the price for their intermediates in an olgopsonistic manner. This
model is applied to the Bulgarian economy, in particular to the agri-food
chain. From this application we …nd that as long as processors allocate real
resources towards rent-seeking activities, there will be no signi…cant wel-
fare gains from free trade. Thus, we …nd “bad” governance to be a strong
impediment to economic growth and development.
1 Introduction
Which policy fosters economic growth? This question has always been one
of the main challenges for development and trade economists. Typically,
the possibility to achieve higher income levels through trade and special-
ization has been widely recognized and ordinary cross country regressions
overwhelmingly …nd a moderate positive relationship between income and
growth (see Edwards (1995) and Rodrik (1995) for a survey on this litera-
ture). However, these studies do not really provide an answer to the initial
1question since …rst, a simple regression over trade and income su¤ers from
endogeneity—countries with high income levels for reasons other than trade
may trade more (Helpman 1998, or Frankel and Romer 1999)—and second,
they do not identify an exact mechanism through which export expansion
a¤ects growth. Challenged by these shortcomings, Dollar (1992), Sachs and
Warner (1995) or Edwards (1998)—among others—use measures of coun-
tries’ trade policies as an instrument for its trade share and …nd a signi…-
cantly inverse relationship between the extend of policy-caused barriers to
trade in a certain country and its level of economic growth. The policy impli-
cation drawn from this results is fundamental: key to higher growth rates is
a liberal foreign trade policy! During the past decade, this …nding has been
widely recognized by (Stiglitz 1998) as well as by policy advisors.1 How-
ever, there remains scepticism. Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) for instance
criticize that this inverse relationship does not immediately stand out in
the data, at least not if one simply compares country growth rates with
standard measures of policy induced trade barriers.2 Therefore, they argue
that indicators for “openness” as used in these studies are “...problematic
as measures of trade barriers or are highly correlated with other sources of
poor economic performance” (p.3). Furthermore, Frankel and Romer (1999,
379) argue that “...countries that adopt free-market trade policies may also
adopt free-market domestic policies and stable …scal and monetary policies.
Since these policies are also likely to a¤ect income, countries’ trade policies
are likely to be correlated with factors that are omitted from the income
equation. Thus they cannot be used to identify the impact of trade.” In
order to account for this sort of endogeneity, Frankel and Romer suggest a
measure of the geographic component of countries’ trade which accounts for
endogeneity but still shows the signi…cant positive relation between trade
‡ows and growth levels. However, while this proceeding more convincingly
accounts for the endogeneity between income and trade, it does not allow
for any conclusion as to which extent an increase in trade ‡ows is caused
by more liberal policies rather than by other factors such as changes in
transportation costs, external shocks etc.
More recently, increasing attention has been given to the impact of gov-
ernance quality and institutional environment on economic performance.
1Based on these insights, the IMF (1997, 84-85) for instance mentions the opening
toward foreign trade as one of the main “Policies to Boost Growth and Promote Conver-
gence.”
2Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) use average tari¤ rates from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators and an index for non-tari¤ bariers to trade taken from Barro and
Lee (1994).
2Based on well-known arguments by Olson (1982) or North (1990), Hall and
Jones (1999) for instance …nd empirically that the di¤erences in capital ac-
cumulation, productivity and, thus, output per worker among countries is
signi…cantly driven by di¤erences in the institutional environment.3 Sim-
ilarly, Kaufmann et al. (1999) …nd an signi…cant impact of governance
quality4 on economic performance for both developing and developed coun-
tries. Accordingly, the World Bank (2000, 136) suggests that “...a capable
state with good and transparent government institutions is associated with
higher income growth, national wealth, and social achievements.” Again,
this issue contains a fundamental policy implication. Although changes in
governance are by far more di¢cult to initiate than simple changes in tax
or tari¤ rates, the evolution of a certain governance builds up on decisions
made by people and thus, can also be changed if just the commitment to
achieve this is strong enough.
So is it the quality of governance the relevant margin on which policies
should act to boost growth and to improve economic performance? Or does
governance quality simply change over time once growth stimulating policies
such as trade liberalization set a country on the right track? In this paper
we will address this question. To compare the relative impact of both types
of distortions we will focus our discussion towards a country where there is
broad evidence for the harmful existence of both types of distortions. We
will exemplarily choose the case of Bulgaria. Therefore, we will start with
a brief review of recent economic developments in Bulgaria. Afterwards, we
will develop a general equilibrium model that considers distortions caused by
taxes and tari¤s as well as market imperfections due to excessive redistribu-
tive activities just as they prevail once governance quality5 is low. Imbedding
these imperfections into a Ramsey-type model of economic growth will allow
us to study the implications of “bad” governance on welfare and growth. In
the fourth section, we will use our model to study three experiments, the
partial elimination of tari¤ and tax distortions, the partial elimination of
the imperfections caused by redistributive activities and the complete abo-
lition of all prevailing imperfections and distortions. Our results will show
3An endogenous factor in their estimations to which they refer to as “social infrastruc-
ture.”
4Kaufmann et al. (1999a, p.1) de…ne governance as “the traditions and institutions by
which authority in a country is exercised. This includes (1) the process by which govern-
ments are selected, monitored and replaced, (2) the capacity of the government to e¤ectively
formulate and implement sound policies, and (3) the respect of citizens and the state for
the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.”
5We will refer to the same de…nition as in Kaufmann et al. (1999a).
3a signi…cant impact of both types of policies with also a higher impact of
governance improvements. However, the highest welfare level as well as the
highest growth rates can only be achieved once policies act at both margins.
2B u l g a r i a n F a c t s
Bulgaria’s transition process started in the early nineties with the liberal-
ization of nearly all prices. This action was followed by a sharp decline in
GDP by roughly 25 per cent between 1989 and 1992. The next three years
were characterized by moderate growth, mainly from large export-oriented
…rms and a small but growing private sector. In 1995, a sharp decline in
agricultural output again led to a contraction of GDP. With the partial rein-
troduction of price setting policies by the government and two major waves
of in‡ation in 1994 and 1996, the economy has stagnated at a level far below
its initial level of performance. The introduction of the currency board in
1997, which has pegged the exchange rate to the Deutsche Mark, has led to
a signi…cant stabilization. However, it remains to be seen whether recent
attempts to improve privatization and restructuring will be able to support
this arti…cial stabilization.
To keep food prices at a low level the government established price ceil-
ings for most agricultural products. This policy, combined with restrictions
on exports, allowable price margins and cost-plus pricing practices of food
processors, have lowered farm gate prices, but they have not provided in-
centives for food processing enterprises to decrease costs and to increase
e¢ciency (Davidova 1994). Instead, they have strongly distorted produc-
tion incentives in agriculture and thus, have even contributed to a major
shortage of bread and grain in 1996 (OECD-CEET).
In 1991, the government started a large privatization process, however
large monopolies continued to exist in particular wholesale and foreign trade
and food processing (World Bank, 1993). On the other hand a land law ef-
fective March 1, 1991 restored the right of formers owners up to 20 hectares
in areas of intensive cultivation and 30 hectares in other areas (World Bank
1 9 9 3 ) .H o w e v e r ,t h ep l o t so ff a r m e r sw e r ee x p e c t e dt ob es m a l lw h e nt h er e -
distribution and ownership of land started. The expected land distribution,
reported by the National Statistics Institute survey of Bulgaria, indicates
that 28.9 percent of the owners would have a plot up to 1.5 hectares, while
22.3 percent between 1.6 and 3 hectares (Keliyan in Coenen Ed., 1996). The
poor land property rights and no established land lease agreements in Bul-
garia prevents farmers from been engaged in large scale production, as they
4con…ne themselves to the area of land that belong (or presumable belongs)
to them. Since the transportation of agricultural goods requires sophisti-
cated and expensive transportation means, this together with the inability
of farmers to produce a large scale, makes impossible or not cost e¤ective
for agricultural producers to bring their output to large communities, and,
thus, they most sell their output to traders and food processors.
Despite the privatization processes continues, privatization does not nec-
essarily mean the increase of competition. Buckwell (1997) argues that if
farmers have not choice about whom they sell their products, then there
is little scope to achieve the bene…ts of a market system, and if state mo-
nopolies are turned into private monopolies, the more fragmented farming
sector is still in large disadvantage. To measure the e¤ects of income re-
distribution in the agri-food chain, Ivanova et al. (1995) and Gorton et al.
(1999) estimate the protection levels of farmers, food processors, traders
and consumers and compare them with their reference world market levels.
Their …nding is that between 1990 and 1996, consumers did not receive the
bene…ts from low farm gate prices as these bene…ts were accrued by pro-
cessors and traders at the expense of agricultural producers. Gorton et al.
mainly explain their observations by the generally high costs of transactions
in Bulgaria. However, given the persistence of the observed redistribution,
it appears questionable that there has been no explicit winner from this de-
velopment since 1990. Accordingly, Swinnen (1997) stresses the importance
of collusive rent-seeking behavior of food processors and traders who for in-
stance have been able to control big parts of relevant distribution channels
such as storage facilities or who have redistributed …nancial assets through
“transfer pricing” between state-owned and private …rms. Furthermore, to
explain the weak bargaining position of farmers, Hanisch and Pavel (1999)
stress the concentration of machines in barely restructured cooperatives, the
weak sanction mechanisms for contract enforcement, the weak protection
a n dt h ed e l a y e dr e f o r mo fp r o p e r t yr i g h t s ,a n dt h ef a c tt h a tm o s tt a l e n t e d
people have left the agricultural sector and have often turned into retailers.
Based on these …ndings, we believe, that the best representation of the mar-
ket structure between agricultural producers and food processor is one in
which food processors have market power over agricultural producers.
3 The model: environment and equilibria
We describe a closed economy. There are two …nal products —processed food
and manufactures— and one intermediate good —agricultural raw products.
5While processed food is a pure consumption good, manufactures are a con-
sumption good and a unit of manufactured goods can be transformed— at
no cost —into a unit of capital, which can then be used to increase the
capital stock of the economy (Kt). There are two economy wide factors of
production, labor and capital, and a sector speci…c factor v; used only by
agricultural producers, i.e. land.
3.1 Firms
3.1.1 Competitive Industries
The production of agricultural raw products YA uses intermediate agri-
cultural raw products IA and employs labor LA,c a p i t a lKA,t h es e c t o r
speci…c factor v services and a nested constant elasticity of substitution
CES/Leontief technology;






A v®v;B I A
ª





0 <® i2fk; l; vg < 1;
X
i2fk; l; vg
®i =1 and µA;B> 0
The agricultural sector sells raw agricultural goods to food processors and
rents capital, labor and the sector speci…c factor v services. The agricul-
tural sector chooses non-negative values of YA;K A;L A; and IA to solve the
agricultural sector’s GDPA,d e … n e da s
GDPA =m a x( paYA ¡ rpkKA ¡ wLA ¡ paIA) (2)
subject to (1) where pa denotes the agricultural commodity price, rpk is the
rental rate of capital and w is the wage rate.
The production of manufactures YM uses labor LM and capital KM





M , 0 <® M < 1 and µM > 0 (3)
The manufacturing sector chooses KM and LM to solve the problem of
maximizing pro…ts, that is
max
KM;L M
[pmYM ¡ rpkKM ¡ wLM] (4)
subject to (3); where pm is the price of manufactures
63.1.2 Noncompetitive Industry
In contrast to the agricultural and manufacturing sectors, food processors
are noncompetitive. There is a …nite number n of food processing …rms
indexed by j (j =1 ;¢¢¢ ;n): Food processors have increasing returns to
scale in production, modeled by assuming that to produce a nonnegative
amount of output YFj, food processing …rm j uses a …xed minimum input
requirement of capital KFix
Fj and labor LFix
Fj ; in addition to variable capital
KV
Fj and labor LV
Fj and agricultural raw products IFj and a technology of
the form













0 <® Fj < 1;µ Fj > 0; and Aj > 0
where KFj = KV
Fj + KFix
Fj and LFj = LV
Fj + LFix
Fj .
We assume that the socio-economic environment in which food proces-
sors operate makes it necessary for them to …nance a rent-seeking and cor-
ruption system through an additional, …xed expense (FC). We think of this
rent-seeking and corruption system as a mix of several redistributive activ-
ities such as bribes that food processors have to pay in order to operate,
activities of new …rms who need to secure their property rights, or attempts
of food processors to roll over their arrears to farmers.6 We further assume
that …rms in this sector enter and exit the market until pro…ts equal zero.
We assume that …rms act as in Cournot competition (see Kehoe and Ke-
hoe 1994) Mercenier (1995) for market power in the output side) by choosing
the amount of intermediate inputs that maximizes their pro…ts. Each pro-
ducer j is endowed with full knowledge of the agricultural sector’s technology
a n dk n o w st h ea m o u n to fs e c t o rs p e c i … cf a c t o rv available in the economy.
Firm j computes the solution of the sectoral agricultural problem, and ob-
tains the net supply of agricultural goods Y net
A (pa;r p k;w ;v )7.F i r m j,




A ;r p k;w ;v
¢
6See for instance Kaufmann et al. (1999a, b and c), or Hellman et al. (2000a and b)
for a discussion of various forms of rent seeking in transition economies.
7The net supply of agricultural goods equals the total production of agricultural goods
minus the amount of agricultural goods used as input in the production of agricultural
goods i.e. seeds and feed grain.
7and incorporates it into its pro…t maximization problem, takes the demand
of agricultural goods of other food processors IFg (for g 6= j)a n dFC as
given, sets the net supply of agricultural goods equal to the sum of food
processors demand of agricultural goods, to maximize pro…ts ¼Fj, subject
to (5),t h a ti s
¼Fj =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
max
Kj;Lj;IFj
pfYF;j ¡ rpkKFj ¡ wLj ¡ paIFj¡ FC; if = 0




£=f (YFj;K Fj;L j;I Fj;p a):


























a …rm operating the market will solve the problem
max
Kj;Lj;IFj
pfYF;j ¡ rpkKFj¡ wLj ¡ paIFj ¡ FC
s.t. fYF;j;K Fj;L j;I Fj;p ag2£
3.2 Households
There is an in…nitely lived representative consumer and an in…nite number
of discrete time periods t =0 ;1;2;:::;1. The consumer derives satisfac-
tion from the consumption of the two …nal products. The utility from the











where 0 <½is the rate of consumer time preference, µ>0 is the inverse elas-




m;t (with 0 <¯ c < 1)
8is an aggregate composite from the consumption of food Cf;t and manufac-
tured commodities Cm;t. The representative consumer has an initial capital
endowment ¹ K0 a n da te a c hp e r i o ds h ei se n d o w e dw i t hl a b o r¹ L and the
sector speci…c factor ¹ v.
At each period of time consumers purchase …nal goods and sell capital,
labor and the sector speci…c factor services. Consumers solve the problem
of maximizing (7)subject to an intertemporal budget constraint
ptCt + pk;tKt+1 + Bt+1 = wt¹ L +( 1+rt ¡ ±)pk;tKt +( 1+rb;t)Bt + pv;t¹ v + Tt
(8)
Bt+1 denotes the holdings of bonds from period t to t +1 ; also subject to
constraint
Bt == ¡ ¹ B for su¢ciently large ¹ B>0
to eliminate the possibilities of Ponzi games, given initial assets position
K0 = ¹ K0 and B0 =0
pt denotes the price of the aggregate consumption composite Ct;p k;t and
rtpk;t are the price and rental rate of capital respectively, wt is the labor
wage rate, pv;t is the rental rate of the sector speci…c factor v,t h ep r i c eo f
b o n d si s… x e dt ou n i t ya n drb;t is the interest rate of bonds at period t; and
Tt is a lump-sum transfer.
Finally, there is a …scal authority or an agent which imposes a tax or an
extra cost denoted FC on each …rm producing processed food. The tax
receipts obtained from these …rms are then passed on to each consumer as
lump-sum transfers. This transfer to consumers is denoted by Tt.
The economy must satisfy the following feasibility conditions. First, the










KFj;t+ KM;t = Kt (10)
9the total sector speci…c factor v used in production, must equal its total
endowment
vt =¹ v (11)
Second, the total production of agricultural raw products must equals its
intermediate demand




Third, the production of processed food equals its demand
n X
j=1
YFj;t = Cf;t (13)
Finally, the capital stock at t +1equals forgone consumption plus capital
stock t out of depreciation
Kt+1 = YM;t +(1¡ ±)Kt ¡ Cm;t (14)
where ± denotes the constant depreciation rate of capital.
3.3 Sequential Markets and Steady State Equilibria
We are now ready to specify the Sequential Markets Equilibria as well as
the Steady State Equilibrium for our model:
De…nition 1 Let Xt =( Ct;C f;t;C m;t;K t+1;B t+1; fYA;t;Y M;t; fYFj;tgnt
j=1g;
fKA;t;K M;t; fKFj;tgnt
j=1g; fLA;t;L M;t; fLFj;tgnt
j=1g; fIA;t; fIFj;tgnt
j=1g;v)
denote a vector of quantities and Pt =( ^ pt; ^ pa;t; ^ pf;t; ^ pm;t; ^ pk;t; ^ pv;t; ^ rt; ^ rb;t;






,ap r i c es e q u e n c efPtg
1
t=0 the number of …rms f^ ntg1
t=0
and transfer f^ Ttg1
t=0; such that:
1. Given prices, and lump sum transfer ^ Tt, the sequence of quantities f ^ Ct;
^ Cf;t; ^ Cm;t; ^ Kt+1; ^ Bt+1g1
t=0 solves the representative consumer’s utility
maximization problem;
2. At time t given prices, quantities ^ YA;t, ^ KA;t, ^ LA;t, ^ IA;t solve the agri-
cultural sector GDP maximization problem ;
103. At time t given prices, quantities ^ KM;t, ^ LM;t, solve the manufacturing
sector pro…t maximization problem;
4. At time t given prices, quantities ^ KV
Fj;t, ^ Lj;t; ^ Ij;t solve the pro…t max-
imization problem of …rm j for j =1 ;:::; ^ nt;
5. The number of …rms ^ nt producing processed food is such that the pro…ts







t=0 satisfy the feasibility conditions (9)¡
(14).
7. The number of …rms times FC (^ ntFC)e q u a l st r a n s f e r^ Tt and
8. Bonds satisfy
^ Bt+1 =0
De…nition 2 A steady state equilibrium is a vector of quantities Xss; a
vector of prices Pss; the number of …rms nss and transfer Tss; such that, for
some initial K0, the vectors of quantities Xt and prices Pt; the number of
…rms nt; and transfer Tt for all t satisfy the de…nition of sequential markets
equilibrium above and are constant for all t.
4 Empirical application
We apply and calibrate the model to the Bulgarian economy using a So-
cial Accounting Matrix (SAM). The structure of this data requires some
extensions. First the agricultural output reported in the SAM for Bulgaria
includes agricultural raw products as well as food for own consumption or
for their sale in local markets. To capture this simultaneous production we
specify total output in agriculture Y tot
A as a CES composite of raw products











0 <¹ A < 1 and ½a < 1
The SAM also reports consumption of agricultural goods by consumers.
However, for the case of Bulgaria, the raw commodities sold to consumers
are in the most part sold by retailers rather than by agricultural producers.
11Therefore we introduce a retailer activity to the food processors problem. We
modify the consumers preference so that they also include agricultural goods
(assumed to be bought from food processors/retailers) and food produced













0 <¯ a < 1, 0 <¯ f < 1 and ¯a + ¯f < 1 (16)
where Ca;t denotes the consumption of agricultural goods and C
¯f
F is a com-
posite good from the consumption of food produced by farmers Cfs and the











0 <¹<1 and ½f < 1
The SAM reports intermediate demand for agricultural, food and man-
ufactured commodities by each sector. We consider this by assuming that
output of food processor j and sector M is a …xed proportion of intermediate
inputs and value added, which in turn is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of labor
and installed capital:




Z ;A ZAIZA;A ZFIZF;A ZMIZM
ª
with 0 <® Z < 1 and AZi > 0 for i = A;F;M
where IZi is intermediate demand for commodity i 2f A;F;Mg by sector
or …rm Z = M;Fj: For the agricultural sector similarly its production tech-
nology is given by
Y tot
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ª
We open the economy to foreign trade and use the Armington speci-
…cation, which introduces imperfect substitution between goods, produced
domestically, and foreign goods.
12Next is the consideration of the public budget. We introduce a gov-
ernment agent who receives income from taxes and tari¤s, provides public
goods and services at a given level G and pays transfers (TG) to the rep-
resentative consumer. The SAM reports revenue from taxation on labor
and capital income, consumption tax and tari¤s on imports. Therefore, the
public budget constraint, in a sequential market setting, is given by










i;t IMi;t + ¿L¹ L + ¿KrtKt for all t
(18)
where ¿ci is the consumption tax rate for commodity i, ¿L and ¿K are labor
and pro…t tax rate, respectively, pIM
i;t and IMi denote the import price and
imports of commodity i and tIM
i is the import tari¤ rate for commodity
i. Since we do not consider explicitly the impact of public goods provision
on consumers’ welfare, we endogenize the rate of consumption tax (¿ci)
subject to an equal yield constraint (Gt = G). Thus, any change in tari¤
or tax policy a¤ects the consumption taxes rate such that the real value of
government expenditures remains constant.
Additionally, we re-write the budget constraint of the representative con-
sumer to include taxes (??):
X
i2fa;fm;mg
pi;t (1 + ¿ci)Ci;t + pfsCfs;t+ Kt+1 + pb;tBt+1
= wt (1 ¡ ¿L) ¹ L +( 1+rt (1 ¡ ¿K) ¡ ±)Kt (19)
+(1+rb;t (1 ¡ ¿K))pb;tBt + pv;t¹ v + Tt + TG
t for all t
where pfm and pfs denote the price of food produced by food processors
and farmers respectively.
We rewrite market clearing equations as to include foreign trade. Also
the production of food by farmers equals its demand
Ys = Cfs
Finally, we assume free capital markets, where domestic consumers can in-
vest abroad and foreigners can invest domestically8. T h u sw ei m p o s ea
8We introduce free capital markets, since with the implementation of a currency borad
in 1997, the Bulgarian economy does not impose important investment restrictions (with
the only exemption of non-private enterprises).
13balance of payments constraint, such that exports minus imports equals
savings minus investment plus service on foreign debt; 9














St = Kt+1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)Kt + pb;t (Bt+1 ¡ Bt)
EXi denotes the exports of commodity i; and FD denotes foreign debt.
An e g a t i v eBt indicates a positive net claims of foreigners on the domestic
economy, while a positive Bt indicates net claims of nationals in foreign
countries (this relaxes the equilibrium condition for a closed economy where
Bt+1 =0 )10.
4.1 Calibration and data
We calibrate the model to a steady state equilibrium solution using the
SAM for Bulgaria. The calibration of a competitive general equilibrium
model is a standard procedure (see for instance Srinivasan and Whalley
1986). Therefore, we instead focus the discussion on the calibration of the
…x cost paid by food processors.
To estimate the …xed cost paid by food processors, we follow the study
by Gorton et al. (1999), which estimates producer and consumer subsidy
e q u i v a l e n t s( P S E / C S E )a sa ni n d i c a t o ro ft h el e v e lo fp r o t e c t i o ni nt h e
B u l g a r i a na g r of o o dc h a i n( s e eI v a n o v ae ta l . 1 9 9 5f o ra ni n t r o d u c t i o ni n
the methodology).


















10Despite the free capital markets assumption, our model can still exhibit transitional
dynamics rather than immediate convergence to the steady state after imposing a shock.
This is because strictly speaking, assuming home and foreign goods to be imperfect sub-
stitutes gives some market power even to the smallest country. Thus, the marginal value
of capital—which equals the unit costs of investments—is not determined by world market
prices only but also becomes a function of domestic commodity prices (see Diao et all.
1997 for a further study of transition dynamics under the Armington speci…cation).
14Assuming, that a the negative PSE of agricultural producers is in part
due to the market power of food processors and traders over the price for
agricultural raw products and that processors and traders use this low agri-
cultural price for covering …xed cost expenditures, we use these results to
estimate FC. However, some adjustments should be mentioned: …rst, we use
a di¤erent aggregation scheme than Gorton et al., in particular, our model
does not di¤erentiate between processors and retailers. Second, Gorton et
al.’s calculations for processors and traders depend on critical assumptions
concerning exchange rate and reference world market prices (Swinnen 1997).
Protection levels for each stage of the food chain (expressed as %PSE,
the rent from protection as percentage of the value of output at domestic
prices) for the …ve main commodities (see Table 1) suggest the magnitude
of income transfers to food processors. In addition to the benchmark year of
our model, 1994, we also present information for 1996 to emphasize, that the
observed redistribution of income between farmers and processors/traders
is consistent over time.






Consumer (CSE) -33 1
Source Gorton et al. (1999)
Food processors and especially traders received positive gains of about
8 to 41 percent of their domestic sales value. Since for both years, a border
tari¤ was placed on food imports, part of the rents is due to protection by
trade policy rather than the result of imperfect competition. However, for
both years, there was also a tari¤ on imports of agricultural products. This
reduces protection of food processors and in particular, it protects primary
producers. But, since the reported %PSE …gures for farmers show negative
levels, we conclude, that part of the positive gains for food processors and
traders and the negative rents for farmers are due to processor’s market
power over farm gate prices. Therefore, we use the results reported in Table
1 as a rough indicator for the level of income redistribution due to oligop-
sonistic competition. By choosing a relatively low value we ensure that we
15underestimate rather than overestimate the in‡uence of oligopsonistic com-
petition. Given the estimations by Gorton et al. (table 1) this appears to
be below the real level of distortions. As we also know from previous ex-
periments, that assuming a value for additional expenditures not related to
the production process (FC) equal to 15 percent of the domestic sales value
corresponds to a %PSE of -10 for farmers, therefore, we assume that the
…xed cost paid equals;
FC=0 :15 ¢ YF
The model is based on 1994 National Accounts data including adjust-
ments for hidden economy activities and production of subsistence food ac-
counting for 26 percent of private food consumption (see OECD 1996 or NSI
1997 for a detailed description of data and methodology).
The SAM does not provide information about payments to a sector spe-
ci…c factor, in the agricultural sector. However, the SAM provides an ac-
count denoted “mixed income”. This is a residual, of revenue minus the
payment to factors of production paid by farmers. In the case of Bulgaria
where farmers do not rent land, since property rights are not well estab-
lished, then we believe that a large proportion of this …xed income includes
land plus the non-paid wages to family workers. We use this as the sector
speci…c factor, in the absence of any other measure.
4.2 Policy simulations
In the previous chapter, we developed a model that explicitly considers price
distortions due to commodity speci…c tari¤ and tax rates, oligopsonistic
competition of food processors due to the prevalence of a rent-seeking and
corruption system as well as subsistence production of agricultural farmers.
The purpose of this section is to study and compare the impact of trade
liberalization and the reduction of transaction costs under an economy where
o n es e c t o rh a sm a r k e tp o w e ri nt h ei n p u ts i d e .
Liberalization of tari¤s and taxes has been widely recommended for de-
veloping countries as well as for economies in transition. The underlying
common wisdom is that trade liberalization increases welfare and favors
economic growth. The reduction of tari¤s lowers domestic consumption
prices and induces an income and a substitution e¤ect. The former arises
from the lower price level itself, the latter from the substitution of domestic
goods by cheaper imports. Furthermore, this e¤ect also reduces the domestic
costs of capital goods, what may lead to an increase in investment and thus,
higher future growth rates. Finally, models with imperfect competition such
16as Harris (1984) suggest that after liberalization, a fewer number of …rms
produce the same amount of output. Hence, formerly …xed resources be-
come available to the rest of the economy (Mercenier and Schmitt 1996).
This reduces the corresponding deadweight losses and therefore, generates
additional welfare gains.
However, trade liberalization also bears some shortcomings. First, tari¤
revenue has become a major source of public income for many developing
countries. Therefore, liberalization either requires the reduction of public
expenditures, or a su¢cient revenue replacement policy, or both. Since in
many cases, a reduction of public spending, for example through …ring of
civil servants or lowering social contribution payments, is not politically
feasible, the most commonly used replacement policy is to rise domestic
taxes. This, however, implies important trade-o¤s with the e¢ciency goals
of liberalization, for instance, when the positive income e¤ect is o¤set by a
rise of domestic consumption taxes.
What are the expected welfare e¤ects from institutional reform policies?
Recent contributions to the impact of rent seeking and growth such as Romer
(1994), Mauro (1995), Shleifer and Vishny (1998) or Sonin (2000) discuss
various channels through which the presence of rent-seeking activities may
a¤ect economic growth. They all conclude that these activities are fairly
harmful to growth as they distort incentives and the allocation of factors and
assets. In our model, this negative e¤ect of rent-seeking activities on welfare
and growth is brought about by the …xed costs which cause deadweight losses
and reduce output and the number of …rms. Consequently, we expect that
ruling out rent-seeking activities comes along with a signi…cant improvement
of economic performance.
To summarize, trade liberalization increases e¢ciency and welfare but
also comes along with several policy trade-o¤s, the importance of which
depend on their relative magnitude. On the other hand, we expect a signif-
icant improvement in welfare and e¢ciency from institutional reform poli-
cies. What our model will provide is a quantitative assessment of the relative
importance of institutional reforms and price liberalization under considera-
tion of various trade-o¤ mechanisms of these policies. In other words, given
“bad” governance and in particular, weak protection of property rights in
the food chain of Bulgaria, what should be more important? “Getting the
Prices Right” or “Getting Institutions and Competition Right”?
174.3 Experiments
In the benchmark equilibrium, several policy measures distort domestic
prices, but also rent-seeking activities and oligopsonistic behavior of food
processing …rms distort the economy. To study the partial impact of both
kinds of distortions on production and welfare we start with excluding pol-
icy distortions under the present level of imperfect competition. Then, we
simulate a “good” governance, strong property rights and a switch to perfect
competition under the initial level of policy distortions by eliminating the
…xed expenditure in the food sector (FC). Finally, in order to capture the
full potential of replacing all kinds of distortions, we run a third simulation
with an undistorted economy. These experiments are de…ned as follows:
1. policy: we liberalize foreign trade by setting tari¤s equal to zero and
replace consumption tax rates by commodity with a uniform rate.
2. market: we eliminate oligopsonistic competition in the food chain
under pre-existing tax and tari¤ rates by setting the …xed costs equal to
zero (FC =0 ).
3. total reform: we combine scenarios 1 and 2.
In all three scenarios we shock the model in the …rst period and do
not consider any exogenous shocks in latter periods. Thus, the endogenous
variables jump to a new level and then, move along the transition path
towards their new steady state. The intention for the choice of this strategy
is to highlight the e¤ects on growth and allocation following an unanticipated
reform. We believe that this strategy re‡ects the speci…c situation of the
Bulgarian case, where various changes of policies and governments in the
1990s have caused a high degree of uncertainty.
4.4 Results
Table 1 allows for a …rst assessment of our experiments. We start with
discussing the e¤ects on welfare, GDP and output. Under policy, welfare
increases by one percent, whereas the new steady state level of GDP shows
a slight decline. Output in the agricultural sector also increases, however
just to a small extent, whereas we observe a drop in output for nonfood
production. Somehow surprisingly, the output of food processors increases
signi…cantly, although initial tari¤s on food imports are the highest in our
model and thus, food production is the most protected activity (table A-1).
However, this is due to a drop in demand for (and thus, production of)
subsistence food following the reduction of prices due to liberalization.
In the market scenario we observe much stronger e¤ects. When policy
18policy market total reform
welfare
1 0.10 6.30 6.70
GDP -0.86 5.56 4.68
output of...
...agriculture
2 1.25 12.19 13.81
...subsistence -12.49 -25.75 -34.17
...food
2 16.87 53.19 69.49
...nonfood -3.14 -3.36 -6.85
1  equivalent variation in income
2  output of food processing firms (domestic sales + exports)
(deviation in percent)
Table 1: welfare, GDP and output (steady state e¤ects)
rules out rent-seeking activities, formerly …xed factors become available to
the most e¢cient industries. This induces dramatic positive output e¤ects
for food (by more than 50 percent) and agriculture as well as a signi…cant
reduction of subsistence production which exceeds the one in the previous
experiment. Furthermore, output in nonfood industries decreases only by
about three percent such that we …nally observe an economy-wide increase
in GDP by almost six percent (table A-1). The combination of the two
previous scenarios in total reform, that is the simulation of a undistorted, full
competitive economy, combines the results of the two previous experiments.
Welfare, GDP and agricultural output change slightly compared with the
market scenario, and output in the nonfood sector declines by about twice
the level of the previous runs. The apparently most signi…cant e¤ect however
i st h ed r a m a t i cr i s ei no u t p u to fm a r k e t e df o o dw h e r et w oe ¤ e c t sm a t t e r .
First, zero tari¤s reduce domestic food prices which causes a drop in the
demand of subsistence food up to a level which is entirely based on consumers
preferences. Second, also the shift towards a competitive equilibrium has a
signi…cant impact on production in the food industry.
To understand these results, we look at the transitional dynamics for
the …rst 25 periods as well as on the steady state e¤ects of consumption
(…gure A-1) and aggregate investments (…gure A-2). High consumption and
increasing investment levels are consistent with large e¤ects on welfare and
GDP (market), whereas low consumption and declining investment levels
explain the small e¤ects on welfare and the negative implication for GDP
in the policy experiment. However, looking at the patterns of prices that
19determine these variables, the results appear to be contradictory. According
to …gure A-3, the Consumption Price Index (CPI) decreases for all scenarios
a n dt h i sd e c l i n ei se v e ns t r o n g e ri nt h epolicy than in the market experiment.
Furthermore, it appears to be striking that the price for investment goods in-
creases when tari¤s are abolished (policy) and thus, imports become cheaper
(…gure A-4). Moreover, why do aggregate investments fall in the policy but
rise in the market scenario (…gure A-2) although for both experiments, the
price for investment goods exceeds its benchmark? To understand this puz-
zle, we need to recall that the model is based on an intertemporal utility
function and the hypothesis of perfect foresight. Consequently, these results
are driven by income-type of behavior. Accordingly, real income of repre-
sentative households depends not only on consumption prices, but also on
prices of factor endowments, on the domestic capital stock as well as on the
holdings of foreign capital assets. Consequently, the answer to the puzzle
lies in the performance of these variables.
Aggregate investments depend on the price for the investment compos-
i t ea n dt h er e n t a lr a t eo fc a p i t a l. U n d e rpolicy,t h ep r i c eo fi n v e s t m e n t
goods increases despite zero tari¤s because the government’s budget con-
straint causes consumption tax rates to increase in order to replace the
losses from tari¤ revenue. This increases the price of the nonfood compos-
ite gross of consumption tax, and since aggregate investment goods mainly
consists of nonfood commodities, it also explains the increase in their price.
Furthermore, the transitional pattern of this price determines the rental
rate of capital since non-arbitrage conditions for investments imply that as
the price of investment goods declines along the transition path, than—at
a constant world interest rate—the rental rate of capital in period t has to
be above this price. As …gures 5 and 6 con…rm, this condition holds for
all three scenarios. The incentive or disincentive to invest arises from the
di¤erence of both prices: as long as the price of investment composites is
higher (lower) than the rental rate of capital, there is no (a strong) incentive
to further invest and thus, the capital stock decreases (increases) as it is the
case for the policy (market) experiment (…gure A-7). As a result, income
from capital declines under policy and increases with market. Furthermore,
low incentives for new installation of capital (policy)a l s or e d u c ei m p o r td e -
mand such that the trade de…cit falls below its initial level (…gure A-8). This
in turn allows households to expand their holdings of foreign capital assets
(…gure A-9) since they have no incentive to expand the domestic capital
stock. However, along the transition path, the higher returns from these
capital assets increases import demand such that the trade de…cit in the
new steady state even exceeds its benchmark level. In turn, the opposite
20e¤ect reduces the steady state levels of foreign capital assets and the trade
de…cit when investment incentives are stronger (market).
While this provides a su¢cient explanation for the development of ag-
gregate investments, capital and GDP, income e¤ects from endowments of
domestic and foreign capital are ambiguous and thus, do still not provide a
straightforward explanation for the low welfare e¤ects of policy when com-
pared with the market experiment. However, looking at the output e¤ects
in an undistorted economy (total reform), we …nd a comparative advantage
in labor intensive (agriculture) rather than in capital intensive production
(nonfood). Moreover, the liberalization of the foreign trade regime also low-
ers the price for agricultural raw products, whereas when food processors
o¤er a competitive price in the market and the total reform experiment,
the price increases (…gure A-10). Therefore, we can explain the drop of the
wage rate below the benchmark in the policy scenario and the rise in the
market and the total reform scenario (…gure A-11) by the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem. Since the labor endowment is by far the biggest source of private
income, this eventually determines real income such that it almost o¤sets the
positive income e¤ect resulting from lower domestic prices in policy, whereas
it supports low prices for the market and the total reform experiment.
4.5 Sensitivity Analysis
In how far do these results rely on critical assumptions? Table 3 in the
appendix shows the steady state e¤ects of selected variables under di¤erent
levels of Armington and subsistence elasticities. The …gures suggest that
although the levels of variables in the model change depending on the choice
of various elasticities, the ranking of the three scenarios depending on welfare
and output e¤ects remains constant. In other words, although the assumed
elasticities have a signi…cant impact on the steady state levels of the variables
i no u rm o d e l ,w ed on o to b s e r v ec h a n g e si nt h er e l a t i v ei m p a c to fo n ep o l i c y
for di¤erent combinations of elasticities. It is in particular remarkable that
not only for welfare, but also for almost all other variables, steady state
e¤ects are stable relative to the other scenarios.
On the other hand we have shown that our results are mainly driven
by Stolper-Samuelson like e¤ects on wages that arise from the switch to
perfect competition. Since the speci…cation of the initial redistribution of
income in the agri-food chain is rather stylized, it is important to analyze
the stability of our results with regard to changes of these rents. Initially,
we have assumed that food processors and traders receive a rent of …fteen
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Figure 1: welfare changes by di¤erent levels of initial income transfers
simulations for alternative initial levels of income transfers for an interval
between zero and twenty percent. As the main intention of this study is
to obtain a stable ranking of the three policies depending on their relevant
welfare e¤ects, we focus the following discussion on the di¤erent welfare im-
plications which we calculate for di¤erent level of initial income transfers.
Figure 1 summarizes the results. Our …rst …nding is that welfare e¤ects for
all three scenarios increase with the assumed level of initial income transfers.
For policy, this is because of rationalization gains similar to the ones pre-
dicted by other studies of trade liberalization and imperfect competition in
a general equilibrium setting. The general intention is that when tari¤s are
eliminated, fewer …rms are necessary to produce a given amount of output
and the higher the initial level of imperfect competition, the higher the gains
from liberalization . For the market scenario, the positive impact on welfare
is driven by the Stolper-Samuelson e¤ect on wages as discussed above. The
higher the initial income transfer, the higher the initial price discrimination
against agricultural raw products but also, the higher the rise of this price
when rent seeking is eliminated and thus, the larger the Stolper-Samuelson
e¤ect on the wage rate. This in turn rises consumers’ income. Finally, the
(always) higher welfare gains in the total reform experiment are caused by a
combination of the two previous e¤ects. As …gure 1 clearly shows, both, the
market as well as the total reform scenario already lead to higher welfare
gains than the policy experiment when the initial level of income transfers
22accounts for only 2.5 percent. Thus, with regard to the assumption which
we test in this section (…fteen percent) we conclude, that our welfare based
policy ranking is stable for a fairly wide range around our initial assumption.
5 Conclusions
B a s e do nan e o - c l a s s i c a lg r o w t hm o d e l ,t h ep a p e rs h o w sh o wa ne c o n o m y
can be locked in a non-competitive equilibrium under “bad” governance.
We assume that food processors set the price for their intermediate input in
an oligopsonistic manner and use the corresponding rents to …nance a rent
seeking system. Although this speci…cation does not explicitly simulate the
rent-seeking behavior, the model incorporates the allocational e¤ects that go
along with this behavior. Therefore, it allows for a quantitative assessment
of the impact of various policies such as trade liberalization or institutional
reforms under consideration of several feedback e¤ects. The results demon-
strate that the initial distortions caused by redistributive activities are very
big and that they push resources out of activities where the economy has a
comparative advantage. Furthermore, we …nd that given the low quality of
governance, there will be no signi…cantly positive impact from liberalization
on welfare and growth. Moreover, since these policies lower incentives to
invest in the country, they cause an out‡ow of capital as well as a decline
of GDP and the domestic capital stock. Finally, we …nd that among the
analyzed policies only the betterment of governance and the institutional
framework can potentially lead to a signi…cant improvement in the alloca-
tion of resources and thus, to a positive e¤ect on welfare. We explain these
results by the dramatic impact of oligopsonistic behavior of food processors
that distorts the equilibrium wage rate of labor, the biggest endowment in
the economy, through a Stolper-Samuelson e¤ect. Consequently, as long as
rent-seeking activities and oligopsonistic competition prevail, there will be
no signi…cant improvement in welfare and growth. Finally, based on a sen-
sitivity analysis we …nd our results to be stable with regard to changes in
critical assumptions of the calibration procedure.
The paper provides an idea about the priority of di¤erent aspects of
reform policies based on a formal framework. However, the most important
drawback is that we assume the rules of the rent-seeking game as exogenously
given by a …xed expenditure which …rms have to cover. Instead, a more
carefully speci…cation of the behavior of the bene…ciaries of rent seeking
and corruption should allow for an endogenization of the rules of the game.
Some examples how this can be achieved are Grossman and Helpman (1994),
23who model the optimal level of protection, Grossman and Kim (1995) who
endogenize attempts to secure own property, or Angeletos and Kollintzas
(2000) who solve for the optimal level of corruption in the spirit of Grossman
and Helpman.
From policy makers’ view, our results suggest that a to attain economic
growth the Bulgarian economy would requires a much deeper reform than
just canceling tax and tari¤ distortions. Instead, policy should focus on
the improvement of governance through the elimination of noncompetitive
behavior and market imperfections. For instance, a su¢cient legal frame-
work and an independent jurisdiction with strong courts are necessary to
strengthen property rights or to enforce contracts. Furthermore, an e¢cient
anti-corruption agency but also several NGOs could help to reduce the ex-
tend of unproductive and redistributive activities. However, breaking up a
well established rent-seeking system will certainly cause the resistance of its
bene…ciaries and thus, will be a fairly di¢cult task to achieve. Therefore, it
can not just be seen as the task of some policy makers or the government
but will instead require the general commitment of the society as a whole.
Therefore, Hellman et al. (2000a) suggest to make the social costs at which
such a system operates transparent to the population, pro-reform groups
and NGOs. In this context, our results could play an important role for the
case of Bulgaria as they show that the social costs of rent-seeking activities
…nanced by the food chain are about six times higher than the welfare losses
due to economy-wide policy distortions.
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